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Abstract
This paper considers probabilistic models of hurricane-induced animal waste lagoon failures
in North Carolina. A substantial number of waste lagoons exist in areas prone to hurricane
damages. We evaluate expected losses which represent actuarially-fair insurance premium rates
for a plan that would indemnify producers against damages from lagoon failures. Our results
imply annual premiums ranging from under $100 per year to over $2,062 per year. An interesting
result is that those areas with the highest levels of expected loss are also those areas with the
greatest concentration of waste lagoons.
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Risks of Animal Waste Spills in the
Coastal Plain of North Carolina
1 Introduction
One of the most serious concerns facing North Carolina agriculture is the ever-present threat of
livestock waste spills and lagoon failures. Nationally, about 40 waste lagoons over°ow each year. In
1999, Hurricane Floyd brought high winds, torrential rains and extensive °ooding to the Eastern
Coastal Plain of North Carolina. As a result of the hurricane, more than 30,000 hogs, 2.5 million
poultry, and hundreds of cattle were killed. Perhaps of even greater concern was the extensive
°ooding of waste lagoons that caused manure and other animal wastes to spill into local waterways.
The storm resulted in the failure of at least 46 animal waste lagoons in North Carolina, some of
which were several acres in size. The result was the release of millions of gallons of e²uent into
°oodwaters, leading to substantial contamination of tributaries of the Cape Fear, Neuse, and Tar
Rivers. The industry as a whole produces an estimated 37 billion gallons of waste which is processed
by lagoon systems (ABC News, 2001). A single lagoon failure may release in excess of 25 million
gallons of concentrated feces and urine (Mallin, 2000).
Although accidental lagoon failures and waste spills are a concern in normal weather, the risks
posed by hurricanes, which have been common in recent years in the Coastal Plain of North
Carolina, are of particular concern. Hurricane Fran in 1996 resulted in the rupture or over°ow of
22 animal waste lagoons in the state. In 1998, a more modest hurricane named Bonnie resulted
in only a single major swine lagoon failure, though substantial concerns were raised regarding the
increased spraying of e²uent in an attempt to prevent lagoon failures.1
The legacy of Hurricanes Fran and Floyd was apparent in September of 2003 as Hurricane
Isabel approached the coast of North Carolina. Livestock producers hurried to draw down waste
lagoons and secure backup power sources as the storm approached. Considerable concern was
voiced regarding the impending risks to open-air waste lagoons. Recent research by Mallin et
al. (1999) and Mallin (2000) con¯rmed that major storms have undermined or destroyed lagoons
1Such spraying, although legal, is thought by some to be environmentally unsound. For a detailed discussion, see
Mallin (2000).
1and washed their contents along with spray-¯eld nutrients into rivers and estuaries. His research
also demonstrated that, even when swine lagoons do not over°ow in a heavy rain, wastes washed
from spray-¯elds can severely degrade nearby waters. As noted, an approaching storm may induce
animal producers to increase their rate of spray application to prevent lagoon failures which, in
itself, may be a substantial source of ground and surface water contamination.
Legislators and policy analysts have debated whether policy might be developed to enable better
management of the risks to producers and society from animal waste spills. Some have argued that a
fundamental °aw exists in state legislation that limits the extent of liability faced by producers with
regard to the damages from spills. One recent article argues that the optimal market-based solution
would involve a requirement that producers carry private liability insurance that would cover any
damages that a spill on their farms would cause (Powers, 1997). Other proposals have included
the establishment of a mandatory risk pool whereby producers would be taxed in accordance with
their risks and potential damages from spills in order to form an indemnity fund that would be
used to address the costs associated with any spills. As the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act
was debated, federal legislators discussed expanding the federal crop insurance program to include
a subsidized plan that would indemnify producers against the liability associated with livestock
waste spills. Such a proposal found limited support in light of its perceived potential for moral
hazard|the concern being that producers may take less care in preventing spills if their liability
is protected by subsidized insurance.
Although a moratorium exists on the introduction of new concentrated swine operations in
North Carolina, the issue of animal waste management remains paramount. An inspection system,
administered by the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR), is used in an
attempt to identify spills and to assign penalties that re°ect the costs to society associated with
spill damages.2
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the potential for establishing an insurance or indemnity
fund that would address the risks to animal producers in North Carolina from hurricane-related
waste spills. To the extent that risks and damages can be adequately modeled, such a plan may have
the potential for internalizing the costs associated with such spills to the producers themselves. To
2Discussions with Keith Larrick of the NC-DENR o±ce indicated that ¯nes and penalties are assessed at a level
consistent with the perceived degree of damages resulting from the spill violation. Of course, the proper measurement
of damages from such spill events is a very di±cult task, both for regulators and for researchers.
2the extent that legislators desire to encourage participation in a voluntary plan, premium subsidies
could be considered. Of course, any such action results in a sharing of risks between producers
and taxpayers and may thus engender distortions in agents' behavior. The results presented in this
paper are preliminary and represent only a single phase of a larger e®ort. In particular, our focus
is largely on modeling the risks associated with hurricane strikes. The association of hurricane
strength (as represented by wind speed) with lagoon failure is represented by assumed functional
relationships.3 Expectations regarding the degree of damages brought about by a lagoon failure
are represented using data collected from the ¯nes and penalties assessed for waste spills in North
Carolina between 2000 and 2003.
The plan of our paper is as follows. The next section discusses general policy and market issues
associated with risk management schemes for environmental damages. The third section reviews
issues pertaining to the modeling of hurricane strike probabilities and the design of insurance
contracts. The fourth section uses data drawn from the National Hurricane Center's \HURRDAT"
database of 152 years of Atlantic Basin storm tracks to model hurricane strike probabilities for
North Carolina. These risk assessments are then used in conjunction with the ¯ne and penalty
data and assumptions regarding storm risks and lagoon failures to price the risk associated with
hurricane strikes. The ¯nal section o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Mechanisms for the Management of Environmental Risks
Environmental risk is risk to property or health caused by natural disasters, or by degradation in
environmental assets. Coping with natural disasters is an ancient problem, and there are a wide
variety of government disaster programs and commercial insurance products that indemnify against
property losses. Concern with pollution risk is much more recent, and mechanisms to manage this
risk have only developed in the last several decades. After some serious setbacks in the early
1980's, pollution liability insurance is emerging as a valuable tool in managing certain types of
environmental risks.
Pollution liability is man-made. Standard insurance contracts cover property loss to the insured
after an event occurs. Pollution damages oftentimes do not involve a loss of property or pro¯ts
3Ongoing research will focus on explicit modeling of hurricane strength and the risk of lagoon failure.
3to the emitter. Instead, the damages are su®ered by third-parties exposed to the environmental
risk, or to the overall quality and functioning of natural resources. In response to a series of
well-publicized toxic disasters such as the Love Canal in New York, a number of federal and state
regulatory requirements were initiated in the 1970's and 1980's. For example, two of the more well-
known federal acts passed at this time are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund).
The federal and state regulations use a variety of mechanisms to force polluters to internalize the
social costs of their actions. Some impose statutory sanctions such as the system of ¯nes used in
this paper to calculate damages from an animal waste spill. They also establish standards of care
that create environmental liability through the tort system. Within the United States the current
liability for environmental damages is estimated to be approximately 20% of the total value of all
property (Freeman and Kunreuther, 2002).
Insurance was envisaged as a tool to manage environmental liability from the beginning. Both
the RCRA and Superfund require businesses dealing with hazardous waste to demonstrate ¯nancial
responsibility for third party damages. Unless a ¯rm can self-insure, the ¯nancial responsibility
must be met by insurance (Katzman, 1988). Since standard commercial policies include a pollution
exemption, the insurance requirement created by the host of new regulations created a gap in
coverage. This gap was initially ¯lled by Lloyd's of London who issued the ¯rst environmental
liability policy in 1975 (Zagaski, 1992, pg. 392). The London market was followed by at least
a dozen primary insurers who were o®ering pollution liability policies by 1983. However, at this
time there was a great deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of losses from toxic torts. Court
decisions were requiring insurers to pay for losses the policies were never intended to cover. There
were also fundamental underwriting problems. Statistically valid information on the probability
and magnitude of loss was unavailable. The combination of all these problems coupled with an
overall loss of pro¯tability in insurance caused the environmental insurance market to collapse in
the mid 1980's. However, in the last 10 years the environmental insurance market has begun to
rebuild as underwriters gained experience in pricing environmental policies and better data and
modeling capabilities were developed. Total premium growth in the last decade has averaged in
the double ¯gures, and as of May 2000 total capacity in the environmental insurance market is in
excess of $1 billion (Hannah, 2000).
4The number and types of environmental insurance products has expanded continuously. One of
the most successful is coverage for damages from accidental release of asbestos during abatement
activities (Freeman and Kunreuther, 2002). A sampling of other products available include: con-
tractors pollution liability, environmental and general liability exposures, cleanup cost caps, owners
spill liability, and supplemental environmental auto liability (Bressler, 2002). There are also a
number of products aimed at commercial lenders. These policies protect lenders from unfore-
seen expenses associated with loaning money to purchase and reclaim Brown¯elds Redevelopment
(EPA). Finally, pilot experiments in Delaware and Pennsylvania are evaluating the e®ectiveness
of preferential insurance rates in encouraging voluntary safety measures in ammonia and chlorine
production.
Several of the commercial products currently available insure against events similar in nature to
animal waste spills. Owners' spill liability and supplemental environmental auto liability provide
coverage for bodily injury, property damage, and cleanup costs caused by pollution released from
a transportation carrier. There is also an insurance product to indemnify petroleum distributors
against damages from failure in underground storage tanks. Under current regulations owners of an
underground storage tank are required to show the ¯nancial ability to cover the costs of corrective
action as well as compensation for third party liability for accidental releases. In response to
political pressure generated by predictions that 25% of all gas stations would go out of business if
forced to purchase coverage from the private market, the EPA has allowed states to set up State
Guarantee Funds that taxed gasoline sales to pay for ex post clean up costs. These funds have
e®ectively barred the commercial spill liability insurance products from gaining wide acceptance
(Freeman and Kunreuther, 1997).
Typically, mechanisms for managing natural disasters are developed and implemented indepen-
dently from pollution risk. This separation is not possible on the coastal plain of North Carolina
because the pollution risk from an animal waste spill is integrally related to catastrophic weather
events. Hurricanes a®ect the probability of lagoon failure as well as the level of damages if a failure
occurs. Risk management strategies must not only address the optimal mix of regulations and
mechanisms for spreading risk as well as the catastrophe component. Given that politicians and
society in general have strong motives to aid in disaster recovery it is di±cult to impose sti® ¯nes
on swine producers already su®ering from heavy hurricane losses. Current regulations completely
5exempt failures caused by severe storm events. While this may be the appropriate response after
the fact, it causes problems by reducing the costs to producers of placing lagoons in areas exposed
to hurricane risk. Insurance mechanisms require producers to pay a smaller fee before a hurricane
occurs. The premium payments correspond to the polluter pays principle, which appeals to our
sense of fairness and has been upheld in the tort system. In addition, by spreading the costs over
time, and over a risk pool, insurance avoids placing undue hardships on producers at a time they
are vulnerable to ¯nancial shocks.
3 Modeling and Pricing Hurricane-Induced Lagoon Failure Risks
The overall goal of our analysis is to obtain actuarially sound measures of the risks and expected
losses associated with hurricane-triggered animal waste lagoon failures. Expected losses represent
the actuarially fair premium that should be charged in order to provide indemnities in the event
of a lagoon failure. Such premiums would be pertinent to any public or private liability insurance
program whereby the insurer indemni¯es livestock producers for any losses they incur as a result of
¯nes or penalties for damages caused by a waste spill. Knowledge of the actuarially fair premium
would also be important in determining the mandatory contribution rates that would face producers
under an indemni¯cation \check-o®" type plan that taxed each producer in accordance with their
risks and paid indemnities in the event of lagoon failures. To the extent that ¯nes and penalties
represent the true damages to society caused by spills, insurance plans and check-o® programs
provide one mechanism that serves to internalize the impact of the spills on producers.4
Agricultural insurance contracts are generally of two distinct types. The most common is \all-
peril" or multiple-peril, meaning that any event that triggers a loss is indemni¯able. Of course,
exceptions are generally made for losses that occur due to negligence or poor-management practices,
though veri¯cation of such causes of loss often presents major obstacles to sound insurance plans.
Almost all of the insurance provided by the Risk Management Agency of the USDA is of a multiple-
peril type. A second form of insurance that is sometimes used to address risks in agriculture is a
speci¯c-peril plan, that covers losses resulting only from a speci¯c cause. Hurricane insurance is
one example of such a speci¯c peril. Our analysis here applies to a speci¯c-peril type of plan that
4The extent to which the ¯nes represent actual damages is debatable. This is an important component of our
larger research plan addressing the design of such risk management programs.
6would cover only those losses triggered by a hurricane strike.
Abstracting from the costs associated with adminstration of an insurance program (including
pro¯ts or returns to shareholders), the appropriate premium should be set at the level of expected
loss under the terms of the coverage being o®ered. Expected loss is often expressed as the product
of the probability of a loss and the expected level of loss, given that a loss occurs:
E(Loss) = Pr(Loss) ¢ E(LossjLoss Occurs): (1)
Thus, there are two components to the premium estimate|the probability of a loss and the ex-
pected level of loss when losses occur. The probability of a loss is determined by two components.
Identi¯cation of the ¯rst component|the probability of a hurricane strike|is the primary focus of
this paper. The second component concerns the probability that a lagoon fails, given the occurrence
of a hurricane. Thus, for a storm of intensity i, expected loss is given by:
E(Lossi) = Pr(Hurricanei) ¢ Pr(Lagoon FailurejHurricanei Occurs) ¢ E(LossjLoss Occurs):
(2)
A number of other issues are relevant to the design of an insurance contract. The term of the
contract is one important consideration. Most contracts pertain to an annual basis for coverage{
such that if one or more loss events occur over the space of a year, indemnities will be paid. In
our case, the event triggering a loss is a hurricane and thus our risk models pertain to the damages
associated with one or more hurricane strikes over the period of coverage. The Atlantic Basin
hurricane season generally runs from June through November and thus annual coverage based on
a calendar year is appropriate. Thus, we consider the risk of one or more hurricane strikes for a
calendar year. Issues related to coinsurance and deductibles are also relevant to most insurance
contracts. Coinsurance and deductibles force insured agents to bear a share of the risk and thus
serve to inhibit claims for small losses or excessively frequent claims. In our case, insurance is based
upon an entirely exogenous event|a hurricane strike. Agents are unable to a®ect the probability of
such a strike and thus our simple premium measures do not account for deductibles or coinsurance,
though the methods developed below are easily extendable to account for such contract provisions.
Equation (2) demonstrates that there are three primary components necessary to measure
expected loss for the speci¯c peril form of insurance being discussed here. First, one must have an
accurate measure of the probability that a given location (e.g., a county) will experience a hurricane
7event. Second one must have an adequate understanding of the relationship between a hurricane
event and the probability of failure for a waste lagoon. We abstract from di®erences in the design
of lagoons and other idiosyncratic factors (e.g., soil type, management practices, age of lagoon,
etc.) that may be related to failure risks.5 Finally, one must be able to assess the expected ¯nes
or damages that result in the event of a spill. We address the identi¯cation of each aspect of the
measurement of expected loss in the discussion that follows.
3.1 Measuring Hurricane Strike Probabilities
The primary focus of the research reported in this paper concerns our attention to measuring
site-speci¯c hurricane risks. To do so, we obtained the HURRDAT database from the National
Hurricane Center. This database contains observations on the strength (wind speed), movement,
barometric pressure, and precise location of each tropical cyclone taken at six hour intervals for
each storm in the Atlantic Basin over the period covering 1851-2002. This database forms the basis
for most if not all hurricane risk prediction models. Perhaps the best known of such models is the
\HURISK" modeling system of Neumann (1987). The HURISK model uses Monte Carlo simula-
tion methods that incorporate measures of wind speed, barometric pressure, and other important
variables in assessing the likelihood of a hurricane strike of a particular intensity at a given site.
Our approach to measuring the probability of a hurricane strike is more straightforward in
that we consider the frequency of strikes at any particular location over the 152 year period of
data. Following the approach used in Neumann (1987), we consider a strike to occur when the
center of a storm passes within a circle de¯ned by a 75 nautical mile radius centered around the
point of interest. Neumann (1987) notes that, when modeling hurricane return periods and strike
probabilities, a distance of 75 nautical miles is a reasonable choice. We used spline interpolation
to convert the location and wind-speed measurements into hourly observations over the life of each
storm.6
To measure strike probabilities across the entire state of North Carolina, we constructed a
grid of equally spaced points that ranged in increments of 0.2 degrees between 33.4 to 37.0 north
latitude and 74.8 to 84.6 west longitude. The rectangular box de¯ned by this grid encompasses
5Attention to such factors is a focus of current research.
6This interpolation is important in that a storm could move through an area of interest within a six hour period
and thus not be observed to have passed through the area.
8the entire state of North Carolina. For each point, a 75 nautical mile (great circle distance) area
was considered and all storms of a given magnitude that passed through this circle were counted.
Our goal is to assess annual probabilities of one or more storm strikes and thus we consider the
number of years out of the 152 year period of data for which storm strikes were experienced. Strike
probabilities were then given by the ratio of positive event years to 152.
As we discuss in greater detail below, we must tie di®erent storm intensities into a variable
probability of lagoon failure. To this end, we considered storm strikes within the following wind
speed categories: 34-44 knots, 45-54 knots, ..., 94-104 knots. A strike probability for each category
of storm intensity was calculated. We used a monotonic spline (a quadratic spline restricted to be
monotonic across di®ering storm intensities) to smooth the probabilities such that probabilities
tended to fall monotonically as the storm intensity increased. An important point is that some
storm events are never observed at certain points in the state. This is especially the case when one
considers strong storm events at points away from the coastline. To address this issue, we extended
the categories of storms out to a maximum of 144 knots. We assumed that the probability of
a storm exceeding 144 knots was zero and then used linear interpolation between this point and
the last positive probability to obtain measures of the probabilities between 144 knots and, for
example, 94 knots (in a case where the empirical probability of a storm of 104 knots was zero).7
These procedures provided a smooth set of strike probabilities based upon the observed frequencies
of storms at each location. The strike probabilities decrease monotonically until reaching zero at
144 knots.
3.2 The Relationship Between Hurricane Intensity and Lagoon Failures
An important component of the expected loss associated with any waste spill liability plan involves
the relationship between the intensity of a storm and the probability of a lagoon failing. In reality,
the most critical storm factor associated with the failure of a waste lagoon is the amount of rainfall
experienced at a point in space. Our focus in the preceding section was on wind speed as a measure
of storm intensity. The relationship between wind speed, which is a standard indicator of the
7For example, suppose the empirical probability of a storm of 94 knots was 0.05 and no storm events of 104
knots or greater were ever observed. Linear interpolation between 0.005 at 94 knots and 0.0 at 144 knots implies
probabilities of 0.004, 0.003, 0.002, and 0.001 for wind speeds of 104, 114, 124, and 134, respectively. This approach,
while admittedly ad hoc, serves to approximate the probabilities associated with unlikely events that may not be
observed to have occurred at a point over the span of available data.
9intensity of a storm, and rain fall levels is certainly strong. However, other factors, including
barometric pressure and the speed of movement of a storm are also likely to be relevant to the level
of rainfall experienced at any particular location. Our current research is working to evaluate this
relationship using weather prediction models and related research from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Association (NOAA).
Our initial research is based upon an assumed relationship between storm intensity, as repre-
sented by wind speed, and the probability of lagoon failure. As noted above, we do not di®erentiate
the likelihood of failure by lagoon type or other site-speci¯c factors, though such re¯nements are
an important topic for future research. To represent a functional relationship between hurricane
strength (a storm of intensity i) and the probability of waste lagoon failure, the following logistic-
type function was assumed:
prob(failurejstormi) =
1
1 + ¯ exp(¡°i)
; (3)
where ¯ was chosen to be 500 to represent a higher likelihood of failure and 1900 to represent a
lower likelihood of failure (at a given wind speed) and ° is given by 0:1¢(wind speed)-2.4. The
hazard functions for the two alternative values of ¯ are illustrated in Figure 1. It is important to
again emphasize that this relationship is based purely on assumption at this point and that current
e®orts are working to re¯ne and better quantify this relationship.
3.3 Measurement of Damages
A ¯nal important component of the expected loss associated with a waste lagoon spill is the
level of damages expected from a spill. Put di®erently, we need to measure the expected level
of damages, conditional on a spill occurring. To obtain such measures, we obtained unpublished
¯ne and penalty data from the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) for the period encompassing 2000-2003. These data contained all ¯nes and penalties issued
over this period for waste discharges and stream standard violations. Of a total of 212 ¯nes, 108
pertained to spill events, with the remainder being associated with permit condition violations or
certi¯cation violations. The ¯nes had a mean value of $7,910 and ranged from a low of $1,935 to a
high of $58,015. A nonparametric kernel estimate of the distribution of ¯nes is presented in Figure
2. For purposes of comparison, a log-normal distribution is also presented. It is interesting to note
10that the log-normal density closely resembles the nonparametric estimate, suggesting that future
e®orts may bene¯t from assuming log-normality when modeling damages.
Several points are relevant to our representation of ¯nes and damages. First, our approach
implicitly assumes that ¯nes are set at a level that represents the extent of damages resulting
from a waste spill. This assumption is based upon conversations with DENR personnel who have
the task of assigning penalty levels for waste spills. Measurement of the overall costs to society
of environmental damages is a complex and di±cult task that merits additional investigation.
However, the observed penalties are relevant to any plan that addresses only the risks to producers
from ¯nes and penalties, regardless of the extent to which these penalties represent actual costs.
It is also pertinent to note that no hurricane strikes (storms with winds in excess of 64 knots)
occurred in North Carolina over the period from which the ¯ne data were taken. Two points
are salient. First, it may be that larger spills and thus larger damage estimates could have been
experienced had this period realized hurricane strikes. However, it is also pertinent to note that
the legislation governing the waste lagoon system in North Carolina provides exceptions to ¯nes
in penalties when severe hurricane conditions are experienced. In recognizing that our data do
not include a period that experienced hurricanes, it is possible that our ¯ne data understate the
possible damages that may occur from a strike.8 In an attempt to account for the possibility that
larger damages may occur under conditions of a hurricane, we repeated our analysis under the
assumption that the actual distribution was a mixture of what we have actually observed and a
higher though less likely level of damages that is not observed in our data. To simulate such a
case, we used a mixture distribution consisting of the log-normal that was ¯t to the existing data
and a normal distribution with a mean damage level of $100,000 and a variance of 5,000. We chose
a mixing parameter of 0.15, implying that the higher damage portion of the distribution is only
experienced 15% of the time. This mixture distribution is also illustrated in Figure 2. In the case
of the mixture distribution, the mean damage level rises to $21,498. Of course, there is no basis
in fact for choosing this particular distribution and re¯nement of this aspect of our analysis is the
topic of current research.
8For example, our data may represent farms that experienced a spill from a single lagoon while a hurricane strike
could induce multiple lagoon failures on a single operation.
114 Empirical Application and Results
As we have discussed above, expected loss is a key parameter for any indemni¯cation plan or
insurance program that would address the risks associated with hurricane-triggered livestock waste
spills. Our goal is to provide measures of expected loss that vary by county in accordance with
di®erences in hurricane strike risks and intensities. Hurricanes generally lose strength once over
land and thus the risks and potential for damages are much higher near the coast than in the
interior regions of the state. In order to gauge overall hurricane strike probabilities, we considered
the probabilities associated with one or more strikes per year from tropical storms that are of
hurricane strength (i.e., of at least 64 knots in wind speed while within the 75 nautical mile great
circle search radius).
A spatially smoothed illustration of the implied probabilities is presented in Figure 3.9 Note
the substantial increases in strike probabilities near the coast and the rapid decline in probabilities
as one moves inland. The expected patterns of hurricane risk are apparent in the diagram, with the
highest risks being realized on the barrier islands of the Outer Banks. Figure 4 adds the locations
of animal waste lagoons to the illustration of hurricane strike probabilities. The ¯gure illustrates
the fact that many lagoons are located in areas that have substantial risks of hurricane strikes. This
fact underlies the basic motivation for our study|waste lagoons in North Carolina are located in
hurricane-prone regions. In particular, note that the waste lagoons are concentrated in counties
that have a probability of experiencing a category 1 or stronger storm of about 15-20% per year.
In the preceding section, we outlined the calculation of expected loss for a storm of a given
intensity. In order to obtain the overall expected loss from any indemni¯able event, we must consider
expected loss across a range of loss categories (i.e., di®erent storm strengths). We considered
expected loss (as determined by the probability of a hurricane of given strength i, the probability
of lagoon failure with such a storm, and the penalty/damage function.) across a range of di®erent
storm strengths. In particular, we considered storms in eight di®erent wind speed categories: 34-





where i = 1 corresponds to the ¯rst wind speed category of 34-43.9 knots and so forth.
9Spatial smoothing was accomplished using the kriging methods of ArcView 8.2.
12Using these methods, we estimated the expected loss associated with hurricane-induced waste
spills for each county. This expected loss represents the actuarially-fair total premium that should
be charged to indemnify an operation against the penalties and/or damages that would result from
a lagoon failure and resulting waste spill. Such indemni¯cation could result from a conventional
voluntary (public or private) insurance program or a mandatory check-o® fund. Recall that the
expected loss ¯gures depend upon a number of critical assumptions. In particular, we have assumed
a relationship between the risk of a hurricane strike and the risk of lagoon failure. Perhaps of greater
importance is the fact that we are representing expected losses resulting from a spill with the ¯nes
and penalties assessed to operations from spills over the 2000-2003 period.
Figure 5 illustrates expected losses for each county in North Carolina. Patterns of expected loss
closely parallel those associated with strike probabilities. Expected loss is highest in the area that
is within about 50 miles of the coast. Again, it is relevant to compare this to Figure 4 above, which
illustrates the fact that lagoons tend to be located in the areas of highest expected loss. In these
areas, expected loss exceeds $800 per year. Expected loss falls rapidly once one moves inland past
the 50 mile band of high expected losses near the coast. By the time one moves to about 150 miles
from the coast, expected losses fall to the lowest category, with values ranging from nearly zero to
$300 per year.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of expected loss to several of our assumptions, we present
expected loss levels for the four counties having the most waste lagoons in North Carolina. Duplin
county, the county with the most lagoons in the state, also has the highest expected loss per
operation at $759 per year.10 We see similarly high expected losses for Sampson county ($590 per
year), Wayne county ($493 per year), and Bladen county ($721 per year).
We considered expected losses for alternative hazard function illustrated in Figure 1. Recall
that this hazard function implied signi¯cantly lower probabilities of failure at a given wind speed.
These are expected to be much smaller in that the assumed probabilities of failure are lower. As
expected, the expected losses are much smaller than those that are obtained for the alternative
hazard function. The substantial di®erence in the alternative expected loss estimates re°ects the
10Note that there is no inherent or assumed relationship between the number of lagoons in a county and expected
losses per operation. The important point is that areas with the highest concentration of lagoons are also areas with
the highest expected losses due to lagoon failures. If lagoons were located with regard to the expected costs associated
with failures, one would expect to see exactly the opposite result. Of course, other criteria obviously underlie the
location decisions for livestock con¯ned feeding operations.
13signi¯cant sensitivity of the expected loss estimates to assumptions about the likelihood of lagoon
failure under given storm conditions. This reinforces the importance of ongoing research to better
quantify the relationship between storm strength and lagoon failure probabilities.
Recall that the penalty/damage data used to assess expected losses in the event of a spill were
taken over a period (2000-2003) that did not experience a hurricane strike. We have argued that it
may be possible that the damages realized by livestock operations may be substantially higher if
a hurricane strike occurs. We considered expected losses generated from the mixture distribution
described above. These estimates, denoted as Expected Loss 3 in Table 1, are considerably higher.
This re°ects the substantially higher expected damages in the event of a spill that are implied by
the mixture distribution.
Finally, we have noted that the current legislation governing waste spills typically provides
exceptions to any penalties in the event of a major storm.11 To examine how expected loss may
di®er if spills that occur during major storms are exempt from penalties, we excluded those damages
resulting from wind speeds that exceeded 104 knots. These estimates are only slightly below those
obtained over the entire range of storm strengths. This re°ects the simple fact that the probabilities
assigned to such strong storm events are relatively low in most areas.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper reports on our initial e®orts to evaluate the potential for an insurance or indemnity
program that would target the risks of animal waste lagoon failures under hurricanes in North
Carolina. The focus of this segment of our analysis is on empirical estimation of hurricane strike
probabilities. We utilize the \HURRDAT" database which contains historical hurricane records
from 1851-2002. We use monotonically smoothed empirical probability estimates to represent
hurricane strike probabilities for a spatial grid that covers the entire state of North Carolina. We
calculated expected losses, which represent actuarially fair insurance premiums for coverage against
the liability associated with lagoon failures, using assumed lagoon failure functions and historical
data on ¯nes and penalties assessed in response to lagoon failures. Future work will focus on
improved quanti¯cation of damages. Likewise, current research e®orts are being directed at an
11To be precise, spills that occur during a rain that exceeds a 25-year, 24-hour event will not result in penalties. A
25-year, 24-hour rain event is the maximum 24 hour rainfall that is expected to occur once in a 25 year period.
14assessment of the relationship between hurricane strength, barometric pressure, storm progress,
and lagoon failures.
One aspect of our results is especially striking, though not surprising. The regions of North
Carolina that have the greatest expected losses from lagoon spills are also those regions where
livestock waste lagoons are concentrated. If spill hazards played a major in°uence on the location
of these lagoons, one would expect to observe just the opposite. We found that Duplin county,
the county with the most waste lagoons, also happened to have the highest expected loss from
hurricane-triggered lagoon failures. In particular, the expected loss ranged from $759 to $2,062 per
year, depending on the hazard function adopted. If one moves only a short distance inland, these
expected loss levels drop substantially to levels under $300 per year.
Current research is focusing on other issues associated with the design and implementation of
lagoon spill risk management plans. In addition to the aforementioned needs for better estimates of
damage and hazard functions, issues related to the potential interest on the part of producers and
policy makers are relevant to our analysis. Future analysis will also consider other factors related
to the risks of waste spills, including soil types and the design of speci¯c lagoons.
15Table 1. Expected Loss / Actuarially-Fair Insurance Premiums:
Major North Carolina Counties with Waste Lagoons
Number of Expected Expected Expected Expected
County Lagoons Loss 1 Loss 2 Loss 3 Loss 4
Bladen 191 721 284 1959 705
Duplin 766 759 290 2062 753
Johnston 101 362 118 985 362
Sampson 652 590 215 1604 590
Wayne 200 493 170 1341 493
Notes: Expected Loss 1 and Expected Loss 2 calculated using the two lagoon failure func-
tions in ¯gure 1. Expected Loss 3 calculated using mixture density in ¯gure 3. Expected
Loss 4 uses same lagoon failure function as in Expected Loss 1, but sets damages equal to
zero if windspeed is greater than 104 knots per hour. All expected losses are county aver-


































































































































































































































































































18Figure 3: Empirical Estimates of North Carolina Hurricane (>64 knots) Strike Probabilities
19Figure 4: Hurricane Strike Probabilities and Waste Lagoon Locations
20Figure 5: Expected Loss / Premium for Lagoon Failure Indemnity Program
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